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Abstract 
 
We consider country-risk as a determinant of education growth in a large cross-section 
of  countries  observed  through  time.  Applying  cross-country  dynamic  panel  data 
estimations,  we  show  that  country-risk  influences  the  education  output  growth 
negatively. This contributes to the literature on the educational production function, as it 
adds a robust determinant of that function. Among country-risks, economic risk is the 
most  influential  and  among  economic  risks,  economic  growth,  socioeconomic 
conditions and, mostly surprising, budget balance have the highest effects. This is a 
very robust empirical result and indicates that politicians should endeavor to decrease 
country-risk in order to enhance education. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
Many  countries  rely  on  education  to  promote  economic  growth,  decrease  unskilled 
unemployment and favor the general well-being. Most recent studies have showed that 
under some conditions education promotes economic growth (Temple, 1999, Mauro and 
Carmeci, 2003, Sequeira and Vilar, 2007). Moreover, education is also thought to have 
a  role  in  favoring  health  and  social  integration  and  in  decreasing  marginality  and 
criminality (Tamura, 2006; Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985). A general consensus in the 
labor literature is that more years of schooling leads to higher wages. 
Given that education is important for both individuals and societies, one would like to 
know how to enhance or how to not prejudice education growth. However, the literature 
does not show consensus on the appropriate policies for enhancing education quantity 
and  quality.  In  particular,  most  inputs  to  schooling  have  been  found  to  be  non-
significant in micro- and in some macroeconomic studies. See Hanushek (2003) for a 
review on this issue. 
At a country level, economic and financial risk may decrease incentives to individuals 
or  families  to  invest  in  education,  since  socioeconomic  conditions  (risk  of 
unemployment, risk of  macroeconomic instability – inflation, high interest rate, and 
government debt) may expropriate the expectation for future returns to schooling. Also, 
political  risk  may  deter  educational  investments,  since  government  failures  and 
takeovers, riots, terrorism, guerrilla activities or war may also decrease expected returns 
from education. As education is a long-run investment for which the first returns are 
appropriated after some years of continuous investment, it is meaningful to consider 
expected risk as a determinant of investments in years of schooling. 
In this paper, we test if country-risk is a determinant of education growth and we found 
that it robustly determines education. Among different types of country-risk, economic 
and financial risks seem to be the most harmful to education, as they also seem to be the 
ones that most expropriate returns from investment in education. This has a clear policy 
implication: if governments want to enhance education in the country they should be 
aware  of  the  economic  and  financial  institutions’  quality  in  the  country.  Previous 
literature  is  particularly  scarce  in  considering  economic  risk  as  a  determinant  of 
education. However, some authors have not been far from this argument. For instance, 
Mauro  and  Carmeci  (2003)  consider  that  unemployment  deters  human  capital   3 
accumulation as it prevents learning-by-doing, considering that unemployment acts as a 
cost for education; Hartog and Vijveberg (2007) had analyzed the effect of risk attitudes 
(among other factors) from individuals and schools in their investment strategies.  
The  paper  continues  as  follows.  In  the  following  section,  we  present  the  data  and 
estimation  procedures.  In  the  third  section  we  present  main  results  and  robustness 
analysis. In the fourth section we conclude. 
 
II. DATA, METHOD AND SPECIFICATION 
1. Data and Sources 
We use three main sources for data. First, the Barro-Lee datasets (2000, 2001) cover 
years of schooling in population, real government educational expenditure per pupil (as 
a ratio to per capita GDP). Second, for real GDP per capita (chain index), we used 
PWT 6.1. Third, the International Country-Risk Guide covers data for country-risk. The 
International  Country  Risk  Guide  Indicator  (ICRG)  is  a  composite  indicator  of  risk 
constructed by the PRS Group, and comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of 
risk: political, financial and economic, in which the first subcategory is the one most 
weighted in the final index. Each indicator of risk is assigned a maximum numerical 
value (risk points), with a higher number of points indicating a lower potential risk for 
that component. The composite risk ranges from 0 to 100. We also present results based 
on each of the three main components of the composite index: financial, political and 
economic indexes. We further detail each of the indexes below. 
Political  Risk  rating  includes  the  following  components:  government  stability, 
socioeconomic  conditions  (unemployment,  consumer  confidence  and  poverty), 
investment profile (expropriation, profits repatriation, payment delays), internal conflict, 
external  conflict,  corruption,  military  in  politics,  religious  tensions,  law  and  order, 
ethnic  tensions,  democratic  accountability  and  bureaucratic  quality.  Economic  Risk 
includes GDP per head, real GDP growth, and annual inflation rate, budget balance as a 
percentage of GDP and current account as a percentage of GDP. Financial Risk includes 
foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of 
goods and services, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and services; 
net international liquidity as months of import cover and exchange rate stability. These 
variables were measured in January of each year from 1985 to 2002. 
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2 Specification and Econometric Procedure 
2.1 Specification and Measurement 
 
We estimate the following equation, which specifies an education growth regression: 
(1)               exp , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 1 . 1 0 , t i i t i t i t i t i t i t i v d t risk country GDP editure classes edu edu ξ β β β β β β + + + + − + + + + + = −
 
The definitions of variables are as follows: edu means total years of education above 15 
years; we also use a variable constructed by Portela (2006) - pedu, which decreases the 
measurement error in that variable and also the proportion of the population above 15 
years old that attain secondary schooling – sser; classes means log of the pupil-teacher 
ratio averaged between the primary and secondary education level; expenditure means 
log of the government educational expenditure per pupil (as a ratio to per capita GDP) 
averaged between the primary and secondary education level; GDP means log of chain 
index real per capita GDP; country-risk means the log of the composite international 
country-risk guide measure ( i risk total _ ) or alternatively the log of the indexes for 
economic ( i risk ec_ ), political ( i risk pl _ ) or financial risk (
i risk fn_ ). Moreover, t is 
a time trend; d represents time-dummies; vi are the unobserved fixed effects and ξ  is 
the error term. In some robustness analyses we also used primary years of education of 
the population above 25 years old (
t i Edu im , 25 _ Pr ) and the Black Market Premium 
(BMP), which are not included in equation (1), for simplicity of exposition. 
The dependent variable and the first three regressors are measured in the same year, all 
of them in intervals of 5 years between 1960 and 2000. The country-risk enters as a 
fixed effect for the country, as an average between 1985 and 2004. This is done because 
of the lack of data to enter in five-year periods. We interpret this as education growth 
being dependent on the expected fixed risk for a country. The dependence of human 
capital  on  expected  risk  is  natural,  given  the  reasons  mentioned  above.  The  two 
additional and stronger assumptions are that these risk expectations are rational, in the 
sense that agents guess the true values, and that they are fixed within countries. These 
further  assumptions  were  determined  by  data  availability.  GDP  enters  as  five-year 
averages between 1960 and 2000. As an example, for education in 1960, GDP enters as 
the subsequent five-year (1960-1964) average.
1   
                                                 
1 We are also assuming that (as in risk) what determines education is expected GDP. The difference from 
the treatment of risk in regression is that this variable has time-series and cross-section variability while   5 
 
In the next Table we present descriptive statistics for the variables. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Observations  Average  S.D.  Min  Max 
t i edu ,   923  4.828  2.838  0.086  12.049 
t i pedu ,   923  5.093  2.952  -0.840  12.392 
t i sser,   950  2.684  1.125  -2.303  4.292 
t i end , exp   410  3.009  0.740  1.047  5.810 
t i classes ,   1242  2.954  0.034  2.688  3.757 
t i GDP,   918  8.164  1.068  5.718  10.537 
t i risk ec , _   1017  3.473  0.201  2.797  3.787 
t i risk pl , _   1008  4.099  0.241  3.342  4.526 
t i risk fn , _   1017  3.448  0.261  2.585  3.879 
t i risk total , _   1017  4.131  0.226  3.467  4.507 
           
 
The logarithms in regressors do not change our results. We choose this specification 
because it smoothes the most volatile series, as can be noted by the analyses of Table 1. 
 
2.2 Econometric Procedure 
We  use  a  system  dynamic  panel  data  Generalized  Method  of  Moments  (GMM) 
estimator  developed  by  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998,  2000)  to  estimate  equations 
represented  by  (1).  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  earlier  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991) 
estimator  tends  to  be  inconsistent  due  to  weak  instruments  when  the  series  for  the 
dependent variables are persistent and a small time-series within the panel is available, 
which is the case in this application.  
The advantages of using a dynamic model estimated by GMM are essentially three: (1) 
control  for  the  individual  country  effects;  (2)  control  for  the  possible  existence  of 
heteroskedasticity and (3) reduce the endogeneity problem, possibly caused by reverse 
causation, measurement error and/or omitted variables. This is appropriate as possible 
                                                                                                                                               
risk has only cross-country variability. We also tested regressions in which GDP enters with one lag, and 
results do not change.   6 
reverse causation from education to risk or expenditures per pupil may plausibly occur 
in our empirical exercise. Some measurement errors can also occur along with potential 
omitted variable bias.  
However,  these  estimators  are  only  consistent  under  two  general  assumptions:  the 
validity of the moment conditions (which, according to Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) 
and Bond et al. (2001) are not so restrictive), that first order autocorrelation does exist 
and that second order autocorrelation does not exist. The moment conditions for the 
differenced equation are the following:  0 ) ( , , = ∆ − t i s t i edu E ξ  and  0 ) ( , , = ∆ − t i s t i X E ξ , where 
s t i X − ,  includes all regressors. These moment conditions are complemented by those to 
the levels equation:  0 )) ( ( , 1 , = + ∆ − i t i t i v edu E ξ  and  0 )) ( ( , 1 , = + ∆ − i t i t i v X E ξ . Thus past 
education should not be correlated with current variations in the unobserved error term 
and past expenditures or risk should not be correlated with current variations in the 
unobserved  error  term.  Additionally,  one  lagged  variations  of  education  and  other 
covariates should not correlate with current unobserved error term and fixed-effects. 
This means that the level of education and covariates could in fact correlate with the 
fixed effect. All covariates except risk had the usual treatment for endogenous variables. 
However, risk is considered as exogenous. As it was considered to be fixed through 
time, lags of risk are not available as instruments. In a robustness test, we relax this 
assumption and consider exogenous (and external) instruments for risk. 
To test the validity of the moment restrictions, we use the Hansen test, which tests the 
null under which the instruments are valid. Thus, the model is valid if we do not reject 
the  null.  We  also  present  autocorrelation  tests  on  the  null  of  no  autocorrelation.  In 
particular, the AR(1) test on the differenced residuals should be rejected and the AR(2) 
test  should  not  be  rejected.  To  avoid  the  overfitting  bias  that  can  arise  from  the 
consideration  of  an  excessive  number  of  instruments  in  this  estimator,  we  always 
considered as instruments the maximum number of lagged variables that allowed for the 
number of instruments to remain below the number of cross-section observations in 
each regression. 
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III. RESULTS 
1. Benchmark Regression Results 
 
We begin by presenting results on the estimation of equation (1) using the original 
Barro-Lee’s variable on total years of education in the population above 15 years old. 
Then we present a table in which regressions use the corrected years of education in the 
population above 15 years old (from Portela, 2006) as the dependent variable. Finally, 
we use the per cent of population that attain the secondary year of schooling as the 
dependent variable.
2 
Table 2. Regressions for Years of Education in Population above 15 
Dependent Variable: 
t i edu ,  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  (4)  (5) 
1 , − t i edu   0.966*** 
(0.000) 
0.909*** 
(0.000) 
0.933*** 
(0.000) 
0.936*** 
(0.000) 
0.912*** 
(0.000) 
t i end , exp   -0.224 
(0.123) 
-0.198 
(0.184) 
-0.164 
(0.251) 
-0.163 
(0.246) 
-0.139 
(0.366) 
t i classes ,   0.610** 
(0.025) 
0.272 
(0.257) 
0.272 
(0.134) 
0.258 
(0.266) 
0.218 
(0.365) 
t i GDP,   0.405*** 
(0.006) 
0.088 
(0.515) 
0.197 
(0.156) 
0.124 
(0.331) 
0.100 
(0.468) 
Trend  0.079 
(0.265) 
0.086 
(0.237) 
0.065 
(0.368) 
0.096 
(0.182) 
0.077 
(0.288) 
t i risk total , _   --  1.161** 
(0.030) 
--  --  -- 
t i risk pl , _   --  --  0.462 
(0.443) 
--  -- 
t i risk ec , _   --  --  --  0.731** 
(0.022) 
-- 
t i risk fn , _   --  --  --  --  0.813** 
(0.050) 
T N.   291  268  262  268  268 
N   76  70  69  70  70 
Number of Instruments  70  60  60  60  60 
Specification Tests: 
Hansen (p-value) 
AR (1) (p-value) 
AR (2) (p-value) 
 
0.183 
0.000 
0.106 
 
0.358 
0.000 
0.220 
 
0.313 
0.000 
0.286 
 
0.477 
0.000 
0.233 
 
0.460 
0.000 
0.243 
Notes: A constant and a complete set of time dummies are included in the regressions but are not shown in table for a 
space reason. *** - means significance at 1%; ** - significance at 5% and * - significance at 10%. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values of t-statistics tests calculated using a robust variance-covariance matrix. 
 
                                                 
2  We  have  also  tested  the  use  of  enrolments  at  the  secondary  level  (from  the  World  Development 
Indicators, 2001 and 2004) as a dependent variable. However, we only reached near 60 observations in 
regressions. Although we reached significant results for risk, we do not think presenting this lower sample 
results will contribute to the point of the article. Thus they are omitted them but they are available upon 
request.   8 
The  first  column  in  the  table  shows  a  benchmark  equation  in  which  expenditures  are  not 
significantly  related  to  education  output,  as  also  is  common  in  previous  empirical  micro 
literature  on  the  determinants  of  schooling  and  GDP  is  highly  significant  in  determining 
education output. When total risk is introduced it becomes the unique significant determinant of 
education output, making classes and GDP become non-significant determinants of education. 
This also happens in columns 3 and 4 in which economic and financial risk is introduced. 
Quantitatively, we can say that an increase in the log of economic risk of 0.2 (one standard-
deviation) would lead to an increase of almost 2 months in education in the population above 15 
years old.  
In  the  next  table,  we present  regressions in  which  the  dependent  variable is the  same,  but 
corrected from its measurement error (by Portela, 2006). 
 
Table 3. Regressions for Years of Education in Population above 15 (corrected) 
Dependent Variable: 
t i pedu ,  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  (4)  (5) 
1 , − t i pedu   0.981*** 
(0.000) 
0.920*** 
(0.000) 
0.929*** 
(0.000) 
0.942*** 
(0.000) 
0.924*** 
(0.000) 
t i end , exp   -0.143 
(0.244) 
-0.068 
(0.608) 
-0.079 
(0.535) 
-0.045 
(0.720) 
-0.013 
(0.923) 
t i classes ,   0.575** 
(0.016) 
0.235 
(0.224) 
0.289 
(0.154) 
0.227 
(0.223) 
0.204 
(0.268) 
t i GDP,   0.347** 
(0.014) 
0.083 
(0.490) 
0.168 
(0.166) 
0.123 
(0.285) 
0.111 
(0.368) 
Trend  -0.032 
(0.665) 
0.000 
(0.995) 
0.009 
(0.906) 
0.001 
(0.988) 
-0.010 
(0.904) 
t i risk total , _   --  0.964* 
(0.052) 
--  --  -- 
t i risk pl , _   --  --  0.487 
(0.329) 
--  -- 
t i risk ec , _   --  --  --  0.549* 
(0.058) 
-- 
t i risk fn , _   --  --  --  --  0.612 
(0.103) 
T N.   291  268  262  268  268 
N   76  70  69  70  70 
Number of Instruments  70  60  60  60  60 
Specification Tests: 
Hansen (p-value) 
AR (1) (p-value) 
AR (2) (p-value) 
 
0.550 
0.000 
0.270 
 
0.693 
0.001 
0.479 
 
0.689 
0.001 
0.729 
 
0.749 
0.001 
0.485 
 
0.682 
0.001 
0.513 
Notes: A constant and a complete set of time dummies are included in the regressions but are not shown in table for a 
space reason. *** - means significance at 1%; ** - significance at 5% and * - significance at 10%. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values of t-statistics tests calculated using a robust variance-covariance matrix. 
 
 
In this table the significant effect of risk in education is due only to economic risk.    9 
In the next table we show results based on regressions in which the dependent variable 
is the proportion of population with secondary education. As the AR(2) rejects the null 
of no second order autocorrelation, when necessary we begin to use instruments at the 
third lag and thus report the AR(3) test. 
 
Table 4. Regressions for Proportion of Population above 15 with secondary education 
Dependent Variable: 
t i sser,  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  (4)  (5) 
1 , − t i sser   0.831*** 
(0.000) 
0.717*** 
(0.000) 
0.764*** 
(0.000) 
0.722*** 
(0.000) 
0.723*** 
(0.000) 
t i end , exp   -2.785* 
(0.093) 
-4.480** 
(0.038) 
-1.754 
(0.310) 
-1.154 
(0.310) 
-3.401** 
(0.061) 
t i classes ,   3.569** 
(0.252) 
1.403 
(0.768) 
4.217* 
(0.098) 
3.071 
(0.258) 
1.182 
(0.795) 
t i GDP,   3.970*** 
(0.002) 
0.866 
(0.688) 
3.371** 
(0.017) 
3.870*** 
(0.002) 
1.768 
(0.334) 
Trend  -0.090 
(0.898) 
0.000 
(0.995) 
-0.001 
(0.998) 
0.183 
(0.664) 
-0.273 
(0.741) 
t i risk total , _   --  19.097** 
(0.049) 
--  --  -- 
t i risk pl , _   --  --  6.376 
(0.304) 
--  -- 
t i risk ec , _   --  --  --  7.779** 
(0.058) 
-- 
t i risk fn , _   --  --  --  --  12.307* 
(0.083) 
T N.   294  269  263  268  268 
N   78  72  71  70  70 
Number of Instruments  57  58  60  60  60 
Specification Tests: 
Hansen (p-value) 
AR (1) (p-value) 
AR (2) (p-value) 
AR (3) (p-value) 
 
0.655 
0.001 
0.076 
0.188 
 
0.598 
0.002 
0.089 
0.810 
 
0.330 
0.001 
0.107 
--- 
 
0.269 
0.001 
0.103 
--- 
 
0.540 
0.001 
0.091 
0.677 
Notes: A constant and a complete set of time dummies are included in the regressions but are not shown in table for a 
space reason. *** - means significance at 1%; ** - significance at 5% and * - significance at 10%. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values of t-statistics tests calculated using a robust variance-covariance matrix. 
 
 
The positive effect of average risk in educated population is confirmed by the results 
shown  in  Table  4,  in  which  both  economic  and  financial  risk  positively  influence 
education. Here a 0.2 increase in the economic risk variable induces more (nearly) 1.5% 
of  the  population  to  attain  the  secondary  level  of  schooling.  In  this  table  the  other 
regressors  seem  to  become  statistically  more  significant:  GDP  positively  influences 
attainment as well as the class size; expenditure tends to be negatively related to the 
proportion of the population that attains secondary school.   10 
In  the  next  section,  we  test  the  robustness  of  each  type  of  risk  in  determining 
educational output growth. 
 
2. Robustness 
 
In this section we perform a number of robustness analyses. For this, we will use the 
corrected number of total years of education as a dependent variable and the reasons are 
twofold. First, it was with this variable (Table 3) that the effect of risk is less significant. 
Thus, robustness tests based on this variable are more demanding in obtaining higher 
statistical  significance  of  risk.  Second,  this  will  keep  the  paper  shorter  and  more 
focused. It is worth noting that for other dependent variables, the results do not change. 
The first robustness check is to drop class size from the regressions. As dependent 
variables measure quantity, class size has two not-distinguishable effects: a larger class 
prejudices the accumulation of knowledge and thus can favor dropouts, which would 
decrease education outputs; a larger class also saves resources (namely teachers) and 
increases the output. Additionally, we also drop GDP from regressions with economic 
risk, as this measure also includes a proxy for risk for the level of GDP. The second 
robustness test is the inclusion of primary education of adult population in regressions. 
As in Barro and Lee (2001), it is used as a proxy for family educational background 
which has been cited as an important determinant of education outcomes. The third 
robustness  test  considers  that  risk  is  endogenous  and  instrumented  by  the  same 
instruments that Hall and Jones (1999) used to instrument GDP: the proportion of the 
population  that  speaks  English  or  one  of  the  European  languages,  the  distance  to 
equator and the Frankel-Romer trade indicator. Table 5 presents the results for the first 
test in which we dropped the class size as explanatory variable. 
As can be observed in Table 5, the exclusion of class size from the regressions tends to 
increase the significance of total, economic and financial risks. Considering these types 
of risk as constant,  GDP loses its significance  in explaining education outcomes in 
comparison with regressions without risk.   11 
Table 5. Regressions for Years of Education in Population above 15 (corrected) – 
without Classe Size 
Dependent Variable: 
t i pedu ,  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  (4)  (5) 
1 , − t i pedu   0.897*** 
(0.000) 
0.747*** 
(0.000) 
0.872*** 
(0.000) 
0.836*** 
(0.000) 
0.846*** 
(0.000) 
t i end , exp   -0.202 
(0.138) 
-0.023 
(0.927) 
-0.211 
(0.182) 
-0.161 
(0.478) 
-0.124 
(0.411) 
t i GDP,   0.381** 
(0.027) 
--- 
 
0.352** 
(0.033) 
---  0.189 
(0.227) 
Trend  0.009 
(0.912) 
0.132 
(0.146) 
0.037 
(0.639) 
0.132 
(0.169) 
0.044 
(0.566) 
t i risk total , _   --  2.903** 
(0.011) 
--  --  -- 
t i risk pl , _   --  --  0.090 
(0.883) 
--  -- 
t i risk ec , _   --  --  --  1.653** 
(0.033) 
-- 
t i risk fn , _   --  --  --  --  0.885* 
(0.073) 
T N.   298  285  269  285  275 
N   77  75  70  75  71 
Number of Instruments  60  41  61  41  61 
Specification Tests: 
Hansen (p-value) 
AR (1) (p-value) 
AR (2) (p-value) 
 
0.729 
0.000 
0.224 
 
0.441 
0.006 
0.460 
 
0.784 
0.001 
0.610 
 
0.387 
0.002 
0.437 
 
0.509 
0.001 
0.395 
Notes: A constant and a complete set of time dummies are included in the regressions but are not shown in table for a 
space reason. *** - means significance at 1%; ** - significance at 5% and * - significance at 10%. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values of t-statistics tests calculated using a robust variance-covariance matrix. 
 
 
In the next table we show results for specifications in which we introduced primary 
education in the older population (
t i Edu im , 25 _ Pr ) as an additional regressor. 
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Table 6. Regressions for Years of Education in Population above 15 (corrected) – with 
Adult Education 
Dependent Variable: 
t i pedu ,  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  (4)  (5) 
1 , − t i pedu   0.546*** 
(0.000) 
0.449*** 
(0.000) 
0.623*** 
(0.000) 
0.467*** 
(0.000) 
0.516*** 
(0.000) 
t i end , exp   -0.064 
(0.633) 
-0.069 
(0.689) 
-0.065 
(0.667) 
0.089 
(0.633) 
0.108 
(0.535) 
t i Edu im , 25 _ Pr   0.576*** 
(0.001) 
0.555*** 
(0.002) 
0.411*** 
(0.004) 
0.608*** 
(0.001) 
0.571*** 
(0.001) 
t i GDP,   0.260* 
(0.078) 
--- 
 
-0.007 
(0.970) 
--- 
 
-0.115 
(0.604) 
Trend  0.069 
(0.344) 
0.154** 
(0.045) 
0.087 
(0.230) 
0.187** 
(0.016) 
0.108 
(0.134) 
t i risk total , _   --  2.458*** 
(0.001) 
--  --  -- 
t i risk pl , _   --  --  1.360* 
(0.064) 
--  -- 
t i risk ec , _   --  --  --  1.812*** 
(0.007) 
-- 
t i risk fn , _   --  --  --  --  1.832** 
(0.017) 
T N.   294  280  265  280  271 
N   76  73  69  73  70 
Number of Instruments  70  61  60  61  60 
Specification Tests: 
Hansen (p-value) 
AR (1) (p-value) 
AR (2) (p-value) 
 
0.451 
0.012 
0.334 
 
0.492 
0.069 
0.413 
 
0.483 
0.023 
0.483 
 
0.513 
0.061 
0.479 
 
0.228 
0.038 
0.485 
Notes: A constant and a complete set of time dummies are included in the regressions but are not shown in table for a 
space reason. *** - means significance at 1%; ** - significance at 5% and * - significance at 10%. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values of t-statistics tests calculated using a robust variance-covariance matrix. 
 
 
Table  6  indicates  that  risk  gains  even  more  significance  when  we  include  years  of 
primary education in the population above 25 years old. In fact, the new variable is 
highly  significant,  as  expected,  but  induces  an  even  stronger  relationship  between 
country risk and education. This is the first time that even political risk appears to 
decrease incentive to education. 
As a last robustness check, we ask if the assumption of exogenous country-risk, as it 
enters as its own instrument in regressions, is conditioning our results. Thus we consider 
that  risk  indexes  are  instrumented  by  exogenous  factors  such  as  the  proportion  of 
population that speaks an European language, the distance to equator and the Frankel-
Romer  index  of  trade.  These  factors  are  highly  correlated  with  risk  indexes.  The 
additional  requisite  to  consider  that  they  are  good  instruments  is  that  they  are  not   13 
correlated with the error term. Theoretically, there is not any plausible justification for 
the proportion of European spoken languages, distance to equator or trade to be direct 
determinants of schooling growth.
3 We present results in Table 7. Column 1 of this 
table is a repetition of column 1 of Table 5. It is presented here for ease of comparison. 
In this table, we also add a difference-in-Hansen statistic that evaluates the statistical 
relevance of the instruments used to instrument risk. 
 
Table 7. Regressions for Years of Education in Population above 15 (corrected) – 
Endogenous Risk 
Dependent Variable: 
t i pedu ,  
(1)  (2) 
 
(3)  (4)  (5) 
1 , − t i pedu   0.897*** 
(0.000) 
0.823*** 
(0.000) 
0.902*** 
(0.000) 
0.922*** 
(0.000) 
0.887*** 
(0.000) 
t i end , exp   -0.202 
(0.138) 
0.006 
(0.968) 
0.009 
(0.927) 
-0.042 
(0.794) 
0.051 
(0.601) 
t i GDP,   0.381** 
(0.027) 
--  0.019 
(0.885) 
--  0.037 
(0.760) 
Trend  0.009 
(0.912) 
0.084 
(0.246) 
0.048 
(0.512) 
0.080 
(0.298) 
0.036 
(0.645) 
t i risk total , _   --  2.568*** 
(0.007) 
--  --  -- 
t i risk pl , _   --  --  1.072* 
(0.078) 
--  -- 
t i risk ec , _   --  --  --  1.933*** 
(0.002) 
-- 
t i risk fn , _   --  --  --  --  1.316** 
(0.018) 
T N.   298  285  269  285  275 
N   77  75  70  75  71 
Number of Instruments  60  41  64  44  61 
Specification Tests: 
Hansen 
Diff-in-Hansen for 
instruments to risk 
AR (1) (p-value) 
AR (2) (p-value) 
 
0.729 
 
-- 
0.000 
0.224 
 
0.311 
 
0.349 
0.001 
0.435 
 
0.522 
 
0.448 
0.001 
0.680 
 
0.309 
 
0.874 
0.001 
0.421 
 
0.615 
 
0.771 
0.001 
0.450 
Notes: A constant and a complete set of time dummies are included in the regressions but are not shown in table for a 
space reason. *** - means significance at 1%; ** - significance at 5% and * - significance at 10%. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values of t-statistics tests calculated using a robust variance-covariance matrix. 
 
 
In  this  table  risk  indexes  remain  highly  significant  and  they  even  increase  their 
significance and their coefficients become higher in absolute values. We note that GDP 
                                                 
3 Tests using different subsets of these instruments reveal that the robust effect of risk is maintained 
through different changes in the instrument set.   14 
again loses its significance when risk is introduced, as we saw in Table 6. Also, as has 
been usual in the last tables expenditure is not significant. 
It is worth noting that all specification tests indicate that the model is reliable, namely 
the Differences-in-Hansen-statistic for the validity of additional instruments. 
 
2.1 The influence of Sub-Items of economic risk 
 
So far we have discovered that country-risk influences education outputs in a decisive 
way, compared with other determinants of schooling. In particular, we have discovered 
that  among  different  components  of  risk,  the  economic  risk  is  the  most  influential. 
Given  this  result,  in  this  section  we  investigate  the  effect  of  different  sub-items  of 
economic risk in education outputs: risk for GDP growth; risk for GDP per capita; risk 
for budget balance, risk for socioeconomic conditions and risk for inflation. Table 8 
presents the results. We present results for regressions in which the measure of risk is 
taken as exogenous and also for regressions in which risk is endogenous. 
We found very significant effects of country-risk for GDP growth, GDP per capita, and 
socioeconomic  conditions  in  educational  outputs,  which  seem  expectable  given  the 
results obtained so far. However, we also found a very significant effect of risk for 
budget  balance,  which  seems  to  be  a  consequence  of  a  ricardian  effect,  as  current 
deficits may imply future taxes that would expropriate future returns from education 
years. Finally we found a non-significant effect of the risk for inflation. While inflation 
is a sign of macroeconomic instability that may decrease the real income for families to 
pay for education, education can also be an insurance against inflation since the costs 
for  education  (which  in  most  countries  have  a  public  component)  may  be  growing 
slower than wages seen as future benefits for education. In these regressions, in column 
6,  expenditure  becomes  marginally  significant,  indicating  a  small  positive  sign  for 
countries with similar expectations for economic growth. 
Quantitatively the effect of risks for GDP growth, Socioeconomic Conditions and risk 
for Budget Balance are the most important (from 1.5 to 1.8).    15 
Table 8. Regressions for Years of Education in Population above 15 (corrected) – with sub-items of Economic Risk 
Dependent Variable: 
t i pedu ,  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Sub-Item of Economic Risk  Economic 
Growth 
GDP per 
capita 
Budget 
Balance 
Socioecon. 
Conditions 
Inflation  Economic 
Growth 
GDP per 
capita 
Budget 
Balance 
Socioecon. 
Conditions 
Inflation 
  Exogenous Risk  Endogenous Risk 
1 , − t i pedu   0.574*** 
(0.000) 
0.463*** 
(0.000) 
0.524*** 
(0.000) 
0.341** 
(0.027) 
0.645*** 
(0.000) 
0.706*** 
(0.000) 
0.504*** 
(0.000) 
0.616*** 
(0.000) 
0.548*** 
(0.001) 
0.704*** 
(0.000) 
t i end , exp   0.247 
(0.183) 
0.124 
(0.502) 
0.208 
(0.278) 
0.151 
(0.516) 
0.135 
(0.498) 
0.159* 
(0.082) 
-0.010 
(0.931) 
0.057 
(0.553) 
-0.125 
(0.320) 
0.195 
(0.134) 
t i Edu im , 25 _ Pr   0.494** 
(0.019) 
0.540*** 
(0.003) 
0.550*** 
(0.003) 
0.645*** 
(0.003) 
0.422** 
(0.027) 
0.419** 
(0.033) 
0.523** 
(0.011) 
0.485*** 
(0.014) 
0.477** 
(0.026) 
0.443** 
(0.031) 
Trend  0.114 
(0.181) 
0.178** 
(0.027) 
0.151** 
(0.042) 
0.222** 
(0.013) 
0.108 
(0.182) 
0.047 
(0.546) 
0.150* 
(0.057) 
0.102 
(0.156) 
0.124 
(0.122) 
0.060 
(0.436) 
i Item Sub −   1.738*** 
(0.006) 
0.946*** 
(0.002) 
1.555*** 
(0.010) 
1.837*** 
(0.003) 
0.174 
(0.386) 
1.836*** 
(0.017) 
0.887*** 
(0.007) 
1.754*** 
(0.004) 
1.660*** 
(0.001) 
0.179 
(0.599) 
T N.   280  280  280  280  277  280  280  280  280  277 
N   73  73  73  73  72  73  73  73  73  72 
Number of Instruments  61  61  61  61  61  64  64  64  64  64 
Specification Tests: 
Hansen (p-value) 
Diff-in-Hansen for 
instruments to risk 
AR (1) (p-value) 
AR (2) (p-value) 
 
0.292 
 
--- 
0.020 
0.536 
 
0.364 
 
--- 
0.044 
0.327 
 
0.366 
 
--- 
0.023 
0.467 
 
0.585 
 
--- 
0.215 
0.487 
 
0.525 
 
--- 
0.010 
0.551 
 
0.329 
 
0.667 
0.007 
0.602 
 
0.538 
 
0.171 
0.041 
0.374 
 
0.324 
 
0.807 
0.017 
0.493 
 
0.472 
 
0.114 
0.025 
0.289 
 
0.359 
 
0.276 
0.009 
0.608 
Notes: A constant and a complete set of time dummies are included in the regressions but are not shown in table for a space reason. *** - means significance at 1%; ** - significance at 5% and * 
- significance at 10%. Numbers in parentheses are p-values of t-statistics tests calculated using a robust variance-covariance matrix. 
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2.2 An Alternative Measure for Risk 
 
In  this  section  we  test  the  effect  of  an  alternative  measure  for  economic  risk  in 
education: the black market premium (BMP), i.e. the difference between the official 
exchange rate between local currency and US dollar and the unofficial exchange rate. 
This is a more restrictive variable than those tested above, as it is only a proxy for the 
efficiency of currency markets. It can thus be considered as a proxy for economic risk. 
It has the advantage to be available for a larger time-series, which allows for within-
panels  variability.  As  this  does  not  measure  risk  itself,  a  significant  result  is  more 
demanding than with variables that measure multiple aspects of risk, as those supplied 
by the international country-risk guide and used above. Black market premium has been 
widely used as a regressor in economic growth regressions. We averaged the variable to 
construct  five-year  averages  from  1960  to  1999,  the  data  available  in  Global 
Development  Network  Database.  We  transformed  it  into  log(BMP+1),  as  usual  in 
empirical economic growth literature (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). We consider 
that  Black  Market  Premium  is  endogenous  (as  lower  education  can  contribute  to 
increase black market premium) and is instrumented by the proportion of population 
that speaks a European language, the distance to equator and the Frankel-Romer index 
of trade, as we did for the risk indexes presented above in Table 7. 
We discovered that given GDP and primary years of education of adults (above 25 years 
old),  the  black  market  premium  negatively  influences  total  years  of  education, 
confirming  our  argument  in  favor  of  a  robust  effect  of  economic/financial  risk  in 
education.  We  show  the  results  in  Table  9.
4  We  show  the  effect  of  black  market 
premium in the same period as GDP and with one and two lags, allowing for lagged 
effects  of  risk  in  education.  In  the  three  last  columns  we  decrease  the  number  of 
instruments and see that the claimed effect is robust to this change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 In these regressions, expenditure is not included as it proved to be non-significant in most previous 
results.   17 
Table 9. Regressions for Years of Education in Population above 15 (corrected) – with 
Black Market Premium 
Dependent Variable: 
t i pedu ,  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
1 , − t i pedu   0.764*** 
(0.000) 
0.758*** 
(0.000) 
0.816*** 
(0.000) 
0.696*** 
(0.000) 
0.748*** 
(0.000) 
0.787*** 
(0.000) 
t i Edu im , 25 _ Pr   0.229*** 
(0.006) 
0.259** 
(0.036) 
0.190*** 
(0.004) 
0.324** 
(0.043) 
0.255 
(0.161) 
0.241** 
(0.011) 
t i GDP,   0.185** 
(0.019) 
0.130* 
(0.096) 
0.114 
(0.105) 
0.187** 
(0.029) 
0.116 
(0.163) 
0.054 
(0.513) 
Trend  0.047 
(0.357) 
0.060 
(0.229) 
0.082 
(0.110) 
0.034 
(0.525) 
0.051 
(0.287) 
0.106* 
(0.056) 
t i BMP,   -0.047** 
(0.042) 
--  --  -0.073** 
(0.039) 
--  -- 
1 , − t i BMP   --  -0.073** 
(0.021) 
--  --  -0.110** 
(0.048) 
-- 
2 , − t i BMP   --  --  -0.060** 
(0.015) 
--  --  -0.126*** 
(0.005) 
T N.   585  572  493  585  572  493 
N   96  91  91  96  91  91 
Number of Instruments  85  85  82  45  45  42 
Specification Tests: 
Hansen (p-value) 
Diff-in-Hansen for 
instruments to risk 
AR (1) (p-value) 
AR (2) (p-value) 
 
0.349 
 
0.641 
0.000 
0.605 
 
0.505 
 
0.829 
0.000 
0.783 
 
0.418 
 
0.652 
0.000 
0.272 
 
0.125 
 
0.358 
0.000 
0.458 
 
0.287 
 
0.239 
0.000 
0.864 
 
0.266 
 
0.730 
0.000 
0.204 
Notes: A constant and a complete set of time dummies are included in the regressions but are not shown in table for a 
space reason. *** - means significance at 1%; ** - significance at 5% and * - significance at 10%. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values of t-statistics tests calculated using a robust variance-covariance matrix. 
 
 
In the next section, we summarize the quantitative predictions of the results presented 
above. 
 
3. Quantifying Effects of Risk in Education 
 
In  the  next  table  we  present  the  quantitative  implications  of  the  regression  results 
presented so far. In particular, we conduct two experiments. First, we assume that each 
variable of risk increases just one standard-deviation, and evaluate its effect on years of 
education, according to the different coefficient estimates, assuming the average country 
in terms of corrected total years of education. In the other experiment, we assume that 
there is an increase on 10 points in risk (which corresponds to a decrease in risk) and   18 
again evaluate its impact on education growth if initially the country is at the average of 
education years. 
 
Table 10. Effects of Risk on Education 
    Increase in Risk = Stand. Dev.  Increase in Risk = 10 
 
Signif. 
Coefficient 
Econ. 
Risk 
Political 
Risk 
Financial 
Risk  Econ. Risk 
Political 
Risk 
Financial 
Risk 
Table 2  0.549  2.17%      24.83%     
Table 5  1.653  6.53%      74.75%     
  0.885      4.68%      40.02% 
Table 6  1.36    6.62%      61.50%   
  1.812  7.15%      81.94%     
  1.832      9.68%      82.84% 
Table 7  1.072    5.22%      48.48%   
  1.933  7.63%      87.41%     
  1.316      6.95%      59.51% 
    Increase in Risk = Stand. Dev. 
   
Risk for 
Econ. 
Growth 
Risk for 
GDP per 
capita 
Risk for 
budget 
balance 
Risk for Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
Risk for 
Inflation 
Table 8  Risk Exogenous  4.92%  2.68%  4.40%  5.20%  0.49% 
  Risk Endogenous  3.78%  2.71%  4.96%  4.70%  0.51% 
      More Instruments 
      BMPt  BMPt-1  BMPt-2  BMPt  BMPt-1  BMPt-2 
Table 9  -0.047  1.72%      4.65%     
  -0.073    2.65%      7.18%   
  -0.060      2.18%      5.92% 
      Less Instruments 
      BMPt  BMPt-1  BMPt-2  BMPt  BMPt-1  BMPt-2 
Table 9  -0.073  1.95%      7.17%     
  -0.110    2.65%      10.80%   
  -0.126      4.56%      12.36% 
 
This table shows that a standard-deviation decrease in economic risk would lead to a 
2% increase in education (in the benchmark analysis). This value can increase up to 
9.68% if the improvement were in financial risk. When risk points increase in a country 
by 10, education can grow from 24.83% (economic risk, Table 2) to 87.41% (economic 
risk, Table 7). As an example, a ten point difference in risk is the difference between 
Australia in 1994 and Australia in 2002 and also between Belgium and Hungary (taking 
the average). This means that plausible difference in country-risk may explain a great 
part of the differences in education growth between countries. When using different 
sub-items  for  economic-risk,  we  concluded  that  the  most  important,  in  quantitative 
terms, are risks for socioeconomic conditions, budget balance and economic growth, 
which account for increases of almost 5% in education output. The great impact of   19 
budget  balance  is  mostly  surprising  and  reflects  a  possible  effect  of  expected 
unbalanced budget on expected taxes that hinders the expected returns from schooling. 
Also worth noting is the higher impact of economic growth than per capita GDP level, 
which  may  mean  that  expectation  of  opportunities  growth  is  more  important  for 
education than expectation for economic income. This reflects the nature of education 
as an investment in the future. In order to decide to educate more or not, one gives more 
attention to the improvement over the present situation. 
We  also  include  the  impact  of  risk  when  using  the  more  restrictive  Black  Market 
Premium measure. We consider a one standard deviation change and a greater change of 
-5. Examples of countries that have experienced similar decreases in  Black Market 
Premium  are  Egypt,  which  decreased  this  risk  from  4  in  1960  to  0.7  in  2000  and 
Guinea, which experienced a change from 6.24 in 1980 to 0.8 in 1999. Figures in the 
Table show that these BMP changes can be responsible for changes between 7.17% and 
12.76%. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this article we show that country-risk is an important determinant of education output 
(and growth) at the country level. 
Microeconomic empirical studies have had difficulty in achieving a consensus on the 
importance of typical production factors as expenditures and teachers as determinants of 
educational quality and quantity. Macroeconomic empirical evidence has also failed to 
show clear evidence of the relative importance of determinants of education. With this 
article we add a new and significant determinant of education in a countrywide study, 
using a dynamic panel data approach: country-risk. As in most micro evidence, we also 
obtain  that  education  of  adults  and  GDP  are  the  most  significant  determinants  of 
educational outputs, among those determinants already tested by previous literature. 
We use data from the International Country Risk Guide to evaluate the impact of risk in 
educational output, taking into account the usual determinants of education, such as 
expenditures, the pupil-teacher ratio and income. We compare the results obtained to 
those obtained with the Black Market Premium as a proxy for economic risk. We also 
considered different variables to measure educational output and different assumptions 
about the endogeneity of risk. Through all the analyses, country-risk and in particular   20 
economic and financial risk are significantly related to total years of education in a 
country  and  through  time.  Among  economic  risk  indexes,  those  for  socioeconomic 
conditions, economic growth and budget balance are the most important. 
Quantitatively,  a  reasonable  difference  in  risk  between  countries  (e.g.  Belgium  and 
Hungary) can lead to a change in educational output of 25% to 87% of the average 
education years in the sample. Also, a reasonable difference in Black Market Premium 
between or within countries (Guinea, from 1980 to 1999) leads to differences from 5% 
to 12% in educational output. These differences could increase the educational level of 
Portugal (near 6 years) to the level of the United Kingdom (near 11 years). At the least, 
these differences are sufficient to explain the increase in educational output in Haiti 
from 1990 to 2000. These results seem to indicate not only a statistically significant 
effect but also a significant effect from the point of view of their policy implications. 
From this article, it becomes clear that in order to increase education, country-risk must 
be reduced. 
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